By now, most of you have heard of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. ___(June 24, 2009), the United State Supreme Court’s (USSC) most recent Confrontation Clause decision, in which it held that lab reports prepared for the purposes of criminal prosecution are “testimonial.” (If you haven’t, it has been reported on by the NY Times here; analyzed by Professor Jessica Smith of the School of Government here; and blogged about on the North Carolina Criminal Law blog here and here, and on the SCOTUS blog here.) I found myself pondering whether the Melendez-Diaz decision would have any impact on procedures currently being used in juvenile delinquency adjudications. I think it might.
Why? First, as a legal matter, the Confrontation Clause applies in juvenile proceedings and has since the USSC decided In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), over 40 years ago. Thus, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and other Confrontation Clause decisions are also applicable. In the post-Crawford litigation frenzy several state courts explicitly held that Crawford applies in juvenile adjudicatory proceedings. In re J.A., 949 A.2d 790 (N.J. 2008); In re N.D.C., 229 S.W.3d 602 (Mo. 2007); In re R.A.S., 111 P.3d 487 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). In North Carolina, the unpublished Court of Appeals decision In re A.L applied a Crawford analysis to statements made by a victim to a police officer shortly after the delinquent act occurred. 175 N.C. App. 419, 623 S.E.2d 368, COA04-1452 (N.C. App. Jan. 3, 2006).
Second, as a practical matter, forensic reports are being used in juvenile delinquency adjudications—and we may see more after the North Carolina Supreme Court decision State v. Llamas Hernandez, 363 N.C. 8 (2009), in which the court precluded a law enforcement officer from giving his lay opinion, without laboratory analysis, that the substance he saw was cocaine. (You can find an interesting post on Llamas-Hernandez by my colleague Alyson Grine here.) Forensic reports are being used in drug cases, assault cases, robbery cases, driving while impaired cases—the list could go on and on.
The impact of Melendez-Diaz may be limited depending on the type of case the report is being offered in. Others, such as Professor Smith, have commented that North Carolina’s notice and demand statutes, such as 90-95(g), providing for chemical reports in drug cases, and 8-58.20, providing for forensic reports generally, probably survive Melendez-Diaz. As far as 90-95(g) is concerned, little should change in the juvenile division, since that statute specifically provides that it’s applicable in juvenile delinquency adjudication proceedings. And while 8-58.20 does not specifically provide for its applicability in the juvenile division, I can think of no reason why it wouldn’t be.
The implication for 20-139.1(c1), which provides for the admissibility of the results of a chemical analysis of blood or urine in driving while impaired (DWI) cases, is slightly less clear. It works much like 90-95(g) and 8-58.20—and like 90-95(g) it contains language that specifically separates superior court and juvenile adjudications from district court—but rather than notice and demand 20-139.1(c1) requires only demand. In other words, the respondent’s attorney must assume that the state will seek to introduce the analysis without the analyst being present in court. Respondent’s attorneythe bears the burden to object at least five days before the adjudication. I’m not sure how many kids are racking up DWIs, but it’s always good to keep the procedure in mind and, as long as the law is unsettled, keep playing it safe by filing written demands in a timely fashion.
Another provision that may be affected by Melendez-Diaz is 20-139.1(e1), which provides for the admissibility of a chemical analyst’s affidavit in DWI cases in district court. The way I read it, 20-139.1(e1) simply doesn’t apply in juvenile court. The procedure for use of the results of a chemical analysis in juvenile adjudication procedures is provided for in 20-139.1(c1) only. The legal analysis stops there.
In any event, any argument that the Confrontation Clause and major Confrontation Clause decisions such as Crawford and Melendez-Diaz don’t apply in district court and, therefore, don’t apply in juvenile court proceedings is, in my humble opinion, misplaced. First, Gault says that the Confrontation Clause applies. Second, that argument hinges upon the notion that the defendant gets a second bite at the apple vis-à-vis a de novo appeal to the superior court. That is a right juveniles don’t have. Third, I believe Crawford and Melendez-Diaz apply in adult criminal district court anyway, notwithstanding the right to a trial de novo. But that’s the subject of another post for another blog.